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'Trumpian' Attitudes in Central Europe: 
Causes for Hungary's, Germany's, and 
Poland's Attitudes Towards Transatlantic 
Trade
Alexis Cooper and Gabriel Davis
Brigham Young University
Abstract
Throughout his presidential bid, Donald Trump has villainized free trade deals. Simi-
larly, the far-right populist politicians of Europe have criticized the proposed Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which aims to eliminate trade barriers between 
the European Union and the United States. While observing these trends of anti-trade some 
have suggested that the criticism directly correlates with the rise of populist far-right move-
ments throughout Europe. To test this hypothesis, we focused on the anti-TTIP move-
ments, both social and political, in three central European nations—Germany, Hungary, 
and Poland. We compared year-on-year opinion polls concerning TTIP as well as state-
ments and actions of far-right populists regarding TTIP to track the anti-trade wave in 
Europe, its source, and its relation to the populist far-right. Our research found that while 
populist far-right movements in Europe often oppose TTIP, they are neither the source nor 
the exclusive home of anti-TTIP rhetoric in Europe.
Keywords
Trump, populism, populist, right-wing, Hungary, Germany, Poland, Orban, Kaczyn-
ski, Merkel
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During a heated moment in March 2016’s Republican presidential debate in De-
troit, Donald Trump leaned forward into his microphone and with his trademark blunt-
ness declared, “By the way...  if you look at the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership], a total 
disaster...it is a disaster for our country” (The Fox News GOP debate transcript, 2016). 
Days later, Trump took aim at another free-trade pact, tweeting, “Gov Kasich voted for 
NAFTA, from which Ohio has never recovered” (Trump, 2016). Trump has been criti-
cal of both trade agreements, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
theTPP, throughout the election season. Trump has argued that the U.S. is “killing [itself] 
with trade pacts…” (McKee, 2016), and has promised that he will shred America’s trade 
deals (Wiseman, 2016). Frustration towards international trade deals is swelling and it is not 
exclusively being directed towards TTP and NAFTA, nor is Trump the only voice speaking 
out against them.
This ‘Trumpian’ skeptical view toward trade agreements has found its reflection across 
the ocean in Europe—where yet another trade deal is being debated. The Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which purposes to create a free-trade zone be-
tween the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) by reducing tariffs and quotas 
and fostering greater trade between two of the largest economies in the world, has recently 
caused a groundswell of concern throughout EU. While many economists and politicians 
on both sides of the Atlantic are eager to have TTIP’s economic benefits (Mankiw, 2015; 
Sinn, 2014), many in Europe strongly oppose the deal, including those who engage in 
similar sorts of right-wing populist rhetoric as Trump. Approaching these situations from a 
comparative perspective, it merits asking whether the demographics of TTIP opponents in 
Europe mirror those of ‘Trumpian’ free-trade critics in the U.S. When we get beyond the 
headlines, is the European far-right really at the heart of the anti-TTIP movement in the 
EU? And, extending the issue beyond Europe and North America, is it generally accurate 
to see a rise in far-right rhetoric as a harbinger of opposition to free trade?
Trump’s attacks find resonance with many Americans because of the perception of 
an established yet shrinking middle-class. Many Americans fear that increased global trade 
would ultimately take away jobs from Americans and give them to citizens of other coun-
tries (Appelbaum, 2016). Trump’s anti-TTIP and anti-trade message echoes their concerns 
and provides a solution for their economic woes. Across the ocean, one can observe similar 
fears to those that Trump has stoked throughout his campaign in the economic debate in the 
EU. Germany ($41,955), Austria ($44,476), Luxembourg ($92,269), and several other EU 
nations with strong economies have relatively high rates of opposition to TTIP (2015 esti-
mated GDP per capita shown in parentheses) (Eurobarometer: who’s for, 2015; World Eco-
nomic, 2016). Indeed, the US has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of $56,421 as 
of 2015 International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, so the idea that anti-trade sentiment 
is steadily gaining ground in countries that are more affluent, such as the United States, 
continues to hold (World Economic, 2016). Resistance to TTIP and increased international 
trade is derived from the fear that another trade deal would disrupt their economy by ship-
ping hundreds of thousands of jobs out of the country (Bode, 2015). 
In countries where there is less economic prosperity relative to other countries, such 
as in Hungary ($12,853), Poland ($12,921), or any of the Baltic states (Latvia ($13,996), 
Estonia ($17,562), or Lithuania ($14,560)), one would expect to see vigorous support from 
the population for any trade deal that would improve the current situation as these countries 
first need to grow economically in order to be able to establish a middle class. Moreover, 
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politically, one would expect to see politicians in countries where the far-right is on the 
rise to be spouting similar attacks against TTIP to those that Trump has thrown at TPP and 
NAFTA in the name of protecting national pride.
Yet, surprisingly, this is not the case in Central Europe.  Extremism is on the rise across 
Europe, and in many countries it is taking the form of right-wing populism.  Marine Le 
Pen’s far-right National Front party is expected to be a viable contender for the presidency 
in France (Bremmer, 2015; Emmott, 2014), the far-right Freedom Party of Austria narrowly 
lost in May’s presidential election (Bradley, 2016), Hungary’s Viktor Orban has retained 
power since he was initially elected in 2010 (Woodard, 2015, p. 1), and Poland elected its 
right-wing populist Law and Justice Party in 2015 (Mortensen and Cullinane, 2015).  Even 
in Germany, right-wing politicians and ideas are taking root as the refugee crisis continues 
to unfold, fueled by the widespread coverage of events such as the New Year Eve 2015 
sexual assaults in Cologne of German women by immigrant men. In each of these countries, 
opposition to TTIP is rampant, as evidenced by statements from elected officials to dem-
onstrations in the streets. The rise of populism coupled with the strong resistance to TTIP 
has caused many to speculate that illiberalism is a critical factor in opposition to free trade 
agreements like TTIP (Appelbaum, 2016; Krugman, 2016; Morath, 2016; Taylor, 2015). 
In observing these right-wing populist governments, it is reasonable to presume that these 
illiberal democracies are more prone to reject TTIP.  
The question this paper poses is the extent to which opposition to TTIP is directly 
correlated to the recent rise of right-wing populism, especially in Central Europe. We will 
explore this theory through case studies of three different Central European members of 
the EU, Hungary, Germany, and Poland, reviewing relative levels of right-wing activity 
in these nations and their populace’s reactions to TTIP. While these countries vary signifi-
cantly in terms of size and economic and political power, they share membership in the EU, 
a geographic region, the experience of undergoing a radical economic shock since the fall of 
the Communist bloc, and the recent ascendance of far-right populist parties. 
Attitudes towards free trade have changed drastically as negotiations have progressed 
since 2013. According to a 2014 poll by Eurobarometer, the median approval rating for a 
trade agreement with the US at the time was 60% across the EU. Germany and Austria were 
least supportive of TTIP (39% favored it in both countries), and Lithuania (79% in favor) 
and Hungary (62% in favor) were among the most supportive nations. In late 2015, Euro-
barometer conducted another EU-wide survey about attitudes towards a trade deal with the 
United States, the most recently available data at the time of publication. The 2015 survey 
noted major changes in the preceding year in the public’s perceptions towards free trade 
agreements with the US. Specifically, across the EU, support for TTIP was at 53%, much 
lower than the 60% median for 2014. Apart from neutrality, Germany’s opposition to TTIP 
alone increased 20% to 59% against TTIP, and in Hungary, support decreased from 62% to 
53% (see figure 1) (Eurobarometer, 2015, p.34). This poll indicates a substantial shift in sup-
port for TTIP among the constituents of the EU which is further evidenced by statements 
made by governments and other news sources.  
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Figure 1: Public Opinion of TTIP (Eurobarometer, 2015)
Year EU Germany Hungary
2014 60%
in favor
39%
in favor
62%
in favor
2015 53%
in favor
41%
in favor or neutral
53%
in favor
Source: Eurobarometer, 2015, p.34
From an economic perspective, comparing the three case studies, Germany has the 
strongest economy, Poland the second strongest, and Hungary the weakest. According to 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, Germany boasts a population of 
nearly 81 million people, Poland nearly 39 million people, and Hungary nearly 10 million 
people as of late 2015, the most recent survey available. In terms of economic output, Ger-
many’s 2015 GDP was $3.841 trillion, Poland’s $1.005 trillion, and Hungary’s $258.4 bil-
lion. The three main economic sectors for all three countries are agriculture, industry, and, 
most importantly, services, which accounted for over 50% of the economy in each country. 
Germany’s exports are responsible for 46% of its economy, Poland’s at 52%, and Hungary’s 
at 93%. The 2015 unemployment rate was estimated to be at 4.8% in Germany, 10.1% in 
Poland, and 6.8% in Hungary (see figure 2) (CIA World Factbook, 2016). Since Germany 
and Poland are closer to each other in economic size than Hungary is to either of them, we 
would expect a similar response to TTIP between Germany and Poland. 
Figure 2: Economic data for Germany, Hungary, and Poland (CIA World Factbook, 
2016).
Country Germany Hungary Poland
Population 81 million 10 million 39 million
2015 GDP $3.841 trillion $258.4 billion $1.005 trillion
Exports 46% 93% 52%
Unemployment 4.8% 10.1% 6.8%
 Source: CIA World Factbook, 2016
Hungary
As Fareed Zakaria defined the term in 1997, an illiberal democracy is a “democrati-
cally elected regime,” quite possibly “reelected or reaffirmed through referenda,” which 
frequently rejects “constitutional limits on their power” and deprives “citizens of basic rights 
and freedoms.” Besides Belarus, perhaps no European state better fits this definition than 
Hungary. Balint Magyar, the former minister of education in Hungary, recently claimed: 
“‘Hungary has become a mafia state, like Russia. [W]hat is different between [former] 
Soviet countries and Hungary is that we went through a liberal democratic development 
first, then took a U-turn’” (Woodard, 2015, p.2). In fact, Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor 
Orban, has stated explicitly that he aspires to make Hungary “an illiberal state,” like China, 
Turkey, Singapore, or Russia (Woodard, 2015, p.1).
Alexis Cooper and Gabriel Davis Brigham Young University
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Coming into power in 2010 on the heels of the global financial crisis, Orban used his 
political clout to rewrite the definition of democracy in Hungary. Many of the historically 
accepted hallmarks of democracy such as religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the 
ability to openly and freely elect leaders have been in Orban’s crosshairs since he took office. 
As a result, the judiciary branch is no longer independent, the courts are packed with politi-
cal loyalists, new election rules favor Orban’s governing coalition, and news organizations 
can be heavily fined for not being “politically balanced” in the eyes of Orban’s government 
(Woodard, 2015; Simon, 2014). When members of the parliamentary opposition have dis-
agreed with individual laws on homelessness, political advertising, gay marriage, religious 
freedom, or judicial review, Orban used his supermajority to overrule their votes, and on 
an occasion, to add his illiberal laws to the nation’s constitution (Woodard, 2015). In 2014, 
Orban targeted organizations that received aid from Norway, going so far as to accuse one 
of the groups of “channeling money to members of an opposition party” (Simon, 2014; 
Mahony, 2014). Orban has stated that, although these changes are different from what other 
countries in the EU do, he is simply trying to do the best for his country after seeing that 
Western democracy and liberalization failed during the financial crisis (Board, 2014; Wood-
ard, 2015; Simon, 2014).
Over the course of the nearly six years in which Orban has held office in Hungary, 
he has repeatedly rebuffed criticisms of his policies and government by the EU. Orban has 
stated that “Hungary ‘will not be a colony’ and [will not] ‘live according to the commands 
of foreign powers,’” that he will not “‘function as a foreign power’s viceroy in Hungary’” 
(Woodard 2015; Feher, 2014). An example of his reluctance to acquiesce to demands from 
foreign powers happened shortly after Orban first took office in 2010.  After the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis left economies around the world in disarray, Hungary faced a mounting deficit. 
In 2009, the European Council mandated that Hungary must reduce its national deficit to 
below 3% of GDP by 2011, well below the national deficit of many of the other stronger 
economies in the EU. By 2012, this agreement had not been reached, and the European 
Council released a statement that “Hungary has failed to comply with the Council’s recom-
mendation (July 2009)… in order to bring its government budget deficit below the EU’s 
reference value of 3% of GDP” (Council of the European Union, 2012). When Hungary 
still failed to comply or make any lasting changes to reduce its deficit, the European Com-
mission voted to suspend one third of the country’s EU funding to try to force compliance 
(Guarascio, 2012). Hungary responded to this perceived attack by pointing out that, since its 
deficit was still among Europe’s lowest, it was undeserving of the sanctions (Eurostat, 2015; 
Guarascio, 2012). These arguments fell on deaf ears, however, and Hungary was forced to 
turn to international financial markets outside of the EU to meet the EU’s standards. At the 
same time, it flouted the EU’s authority via short-term budget cuts as opposed to sustainable 
long-term measures (Carney, 2012; Guarascio, 2012; CIA World Factbook, 2016).
Considering this history, it is important to remember that TTIP is an EU-sponsored 
trade agreement, one designed to improve relations between the EU and the US and foster 
free trade between the two largest economies in the world. TTIP is therefore a symbol of 
increased liberalism and greater integration—in short, everything against which Orban is 
fighting (Traub, 2015). Orban aspires to protect Hungary’s national sovereignty as an illib-
eral democracy and has stated that he “cannot support an agreement [such as TTIP] that…
results in Hungary relinquishing any part of its sovereignty” (Szakacs, 2015). This attitude 
mainly stems from the removal of Hungary’s sovereignty to an international body that 
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makes decisions without protecting Hungary’s best interests, both in terms of trade tariffs 
and quotas as well as an international court system. Moreover, playing by international 
rules flies directly in the face of what Orban has tried to establish and historically what he 
has done. In 2015 Eleni Kounalakis, the US ambassador for Hungary during the first three 
years of Orban’s regime, noted that, “a single company controlled by a close ally and former 
college roommate of Orban’s, Közgép, had won $1.3 billion in government contracts in 
the first two years of his administration” (Woodard, 2015). The implications of this are that 
“international companies located in Hungary that ordinarily would have bid for the projects 
told us it was no longer worth the time and money required to submit proposals, because 
Közgép was sure to win” (Woodard, 2015). International free trade agreements, including 
TTIP, would compel Hungary to liberate its market and change the political policies that 
it has already changed.  
Behind the vitriol and vehement opposition to TTIP is almost exclusively the Hun-
garian government. Indeed, in the same Eurobarometer poll in late 2015, Hungarians sup-
ported TTIP by 53%, lower than the 62% by which they had supported TTIP in 2014 but 
still overwhelmingly supportive of TTIP, especially when compared to other countries in 
the EU (Eurobarometer, 2015, p.34). This level of support among the people does not 
match the criticisms and hidebound declarations of the Hungarian government. It is worth 
noting that since Orban has been able to change the Hungarian constitution in ways that 
make it extremely difficult for his party to be removed from power, his government is not 
as obligated to acquiesce to the will of the people as other, more democratic countries such 
as Germany. 
However, illiberalism is not the only explanation, nor the most compelling for the 
Hungarian leadership’s opposition to TTIP. Some of Hungary’s main concerns with TTIP 
are its potential impact on Hungarian sovereignty. Until World War I, Hungary was part 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where most of the power resided in Austria; after World 
War II (WWII), Hungary became a satellite state of the Soviet Union. Hungary’s puppet 
communist regime fell in 1989, and ever since it has been fiercely protective of its indepen-
dence (Donovan, 2012). Orban has made countless statements since taking power vowing 
to defend Hungary’s sovereignty from the manipulation of and corruption by foreign pow-
ers and foreign companies (Szakacs, 2015; Hungary will not, 2015). This could be because 
of a desire to protect his illiberal policies, but it could also be Hungarian national pride, as 
the last two decades are the first two decades in over a century in which Hungary has ex-
perienced actual sovereignty. 
Furthermore, Hungary’s economy is built around the service sectors (65%), manufac-
turing (31%), and agriculture (4%) (CIA, 2016). Despite agriculture’s relatively small role, in 
2015 Hungary passed a law prohibiting the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
within its borders and has made numerous statements calling for the protection of the 
agricultural industry, further emphasizing its outsized importance in Hungary’s economy 
(Sarmadi, 2015; House Speaker, 2015; Hungarian Government, 2015). Although agricul-
ture only makes up a small portion of Hungary’s economy, it constitutes a large portion of 
Hungary’s cultural identity. According to the CIA World Factbook, agriculture in 2015 
constituted 4.4% of the Hungarian economy (CIA World Factbook, 2016). Yet prior to 
joining the EU, agriculture was a much more dominant industry in Hungary. In fact, be-
tween the fall of the Soviet Union in 1994 and when Hungary announced it was joining 
the EU in 2003, agriculture hovered around 6.7%. Since joining the EU, the impact of 
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Hungary’s agricultural sector on GDP has dropped to average 4.3%, an impact that is still 
lamented across Hungary (World Bank, 2016). 
Before WWII, Hungary’s economy was mostly agricultural, but that all changed when 
the Soviet Union took over in the late 1940s. As part of the communist policies imple-
mented across the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the time, a forced in-
dustrialization took place in Hungary, shifting those employed in agriculture from “more 
than half to about one-eighth by the 1990s” (Hungary, 2016). Because industrialization 
was foisted upon Hungary by the Soviet Union, many Hungarians still choose to identify 
with the agricultural identity of previous centuries. As such, Hungary’s leadership has made 
several statements arguing for the protection of small- and medium-size businesses and for 
the protection of its agricultural sector, both of which are critical components of its cultural 
identity (House Speaker, 2015; Sarmadi, 2016; Szijjártó, 2015). A free trade agreement, 
despite the countless statements of the EU stating otherwise, raises concerns that Hungary 
would have to bring back GMOs or adopt a policy or law that would adversely affect its 
agricultural industry and therefore impact its cultural identity. Ceding power and interests to 
an international body would not only jeopardize Hungary’s cultural identity, but also would 
relinquish some of its sovereignty. Both of these outcomes are reasonable justifications for 
opposing TTIP.
Germany
In contrast to Hungary, Germany is not run by a far-right populist, nor does its current 
coalition government have particularly illiberal democratic policies.  However, the largely 
transparent and constitution-observing nation has voiced strong opposition to the trade 
deal. On the one hand, the head of the German government, Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
and her CDU party are nominally in favor of TTIP. On the other hand, different offices of 
the German government, including the judicial branch of the government, do not share the 
same excitement (TTIP trade talks, 2016). Additionally, other political parties have doubts 
about TTIP. Both Kathrin Oertel, the former leader of the anti-Islamic far-right populist 
movement Pegida, (Ex-Pegida, 2016), and the rising far-right party Alternative for Ger-
many (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD) have recently expressed their opposition to the 
trade deal. These far-right leaders share the sentiments of much of the German population 
that has been very outspoken about its resistance towards the proposed deal (Eurobarom-
eter, 2015, p. 34). In this respect, Germany’s opposition to TTIP seems contrary to that 
of Hungary’s, as its opposition is not being led by its head of government. Thus, Germany 
seems to provide an interesting counter to the theory that resistance to TTIP is inherently 
linked to illiberal democracies.
There are few nations on either side of the Atlantic, where the reaction towards TTIP 
has been as negative as Germany. Germany, alongside Austria, Luxembourg and Slovenia, 
is the only where the citizens against TTIP outnumber those in favor (Rehn, 2016). Ger-
man EU negotiators and the EU parliamentarians have been some of the most outspoken 
in opposing TTIP (Vincenti, 2015). The fears expressed both by the Germany’s far-right 
and the German population are varied, but there are two aspect that often dominate the 
anti-TTIP rhetoric. 
First, the existence of an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in TTIP. ISDS is an 
option that exists within an international trade deal that is available to foreign corporations 
allowing them to sue national governments for losses on investment if a country’s laws have 
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a negative effect on investment. ISDS is in roughly 2,700 Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BIT) worldwide including NAFTA (Farrell, 2015). Ironically, Germany, the first country 
to form investor protection through the development of investor-state dispute system, now 
houses some of its greatest critics. To address their concerns, the European Commission 
proposed a new form of regulating conflicts between state and foreign investors within 
TTIP, the investor court system (ICS). Though the proposed ICS promises to be more ac-
cessible to small- and medium-sized businesses and to be more transparent than ISDS, the 
German Magistrates Association (a professional organization of judges and public prosecu-
tors) still claims that “the ICS represents a threat to the sovereignty of legal systems already 
in place in Europe,” and that “they put little faith in the EU’s ability to manage it” (Knight, 
2016).  This criticism of the German government mirrors the concerns of its people that 
the power allotted American private investors to sue national governments in an unelected 
court is too great, too dangerous, and an infringement of sovereignty.
Second, the “closed door” nature of the negotiations, has made many Germans view 
the whole proposal as a “Trojan horse,” as there has been little to no access given to the 
media or public (Durden, 2016). This aspect of TTIP has been, in addition to ISDS, one 
of the most concerning to Germans—who are wary of any secrecy involving business and/
or government. The caution goes beyond the thousands who have protested against the 
“big veil of secrecy” to public officials (Durden, 2016). Norbert Lammert, the President of 
the German Bundestag and member of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union of Germany 
(Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands or CDU) party, has also expressed reserva-
tion regarding the secret trade talks, which even national parliaments have been unable to 
access. In October 2015 he threatened to vote against TTIP in the Bundestag demanding 
that trade negotiations “should be accessible to all EU member states, governments and 
parliaments” (Germany Calls for More TTIP Transparency, 2015). To try and address this 
concern about TTIP negotiation Germany’s Minister of Economics Sigmar Gabriel created 
a TTIP “reading room,” in which German parliamentarians are allowed limited access to 
TTIP negotiation documents (Von Hein, 2016). However the reading room, much like the 
ICS as an answer to ISDS, has not been seen as an acceptable answer to the problem. The 
overregulation of the room, with bans on cell phone, laptops, and copying, has caused crit-
ics in Germany to call the room “laughable” (Pinzler, 2016). As both these issues, ISDS and 
closed-door negotiations, remain unresolved in the eyes of many in Germany, frustration 
has grown and a political opportunity has presented itself.
In October 2015 hundreds of thousands of German citizens gathered in the German 
capitol, Berlin, for an anti-TTIP protest (Johnston, 2015). Only six months later, President 
Obama was greeted with 35,000 anti-TTIP demonstrators in Hanover on his visit to the 
CEBIT international trade fair (Eckardt, 2016). In the wake of such protests, anti-TTIP 
found an institutional home in the far-right Alternative for Germany party (AfD). AfD 
is part of the populist movement in Germany that has taken an anti-refugee stance as the 
European refugee crisis has unfolded. Though the party originally took a neutral approach 
to TTIP, its stance on TTIP has recently soured to attract Germans belonging to the anti-
TTIP wave. In March 2016 the AfD saw its power in German politics soar as it won 24%, 
13%, and 15% of the votes in three state elections (German state elections, 2016), thus sur-
passing the 5% threshold required by German law for a party to gain seats in the parliament. 
After this great showing for the up-and-coming party, AfD deputy spokesperson Alexander 
Gauland and chairwoman Frauke Petry announced for the first time their party’s official op-
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position to the trade deal (Sagener, 2016). With this official stance coming only recently, it 
would seem that this move by this far-right party is an attempt to score political points with 
angry constituents and not a move deeply rooted in the party’s convictions.
In short, the AfD exemplifies the general pattern of the German anti-TTIP movement 
being more organic than party-based. Far from the wellspring of anti-TTIP sentiment, Ger-
man far-right parties have adopted anti-TTIP rhetoric to pander to opponents of free trade.
Poland
Like Hungary, Poland’s far-right rhetoric comes more from its elected officials than 
grassroots movements. In many instances, Poland is following Hungary’s path down the far 
right. Upon election in November 2015 (which was won by a landslide), the Polish Law 
and Justice controlled both the legislative and executive branches, a first in Polish history. 
The party wasted no time in getting started with its agenda—in just a few months, it has 
passed laws constraining the media, tried to install its judges on the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal (akin to the US Supreme Court) and has tried to rewrite the rules so as to prevent 
the Tribunal from exercising its ability to quickly veto legislation (Rettman, 2015, Sobczyk, 
2016, EurActiv, 2016, Cienski, 2016, Poland’s PiS,). Although the actual president of Po-
land is Andrzej Duda and the Prime Minister Beata Szydlo, the true leader pulling the strings 
is the vocal Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the Law and Justice party leader (Cienski, 2015, The king 
of Poland, Davies, 2016).  Kaczynski has stated on more than one occasion that he admires 
the illiberal democracy in Hungary and wishes to emulate it in Poland by building “Buda-
pest in Warsaw” (Smolar, 2016, On the naughty step, 2016). His party’s moves to curb the 
independence of the media and control the courts are definitely reminiscent of what Orban 
has done in Hungary since taking power.
Yet given the far-right political gains from Poland’s leadership, it is surprising that 
Poland would still support TTIP as strongly as it does. Public opinion polls aside, even the 
statements from the government in Poland focus more on Russia, Germany, and immigra-
tion than anti-trade and anti-TTIP rhetoric (On the naughty step, 2016, Politico, 2016 , 
Gessen, 2016, Cienski, 2016, Migrants carry). Indeed, when TTIP is mentioned in Polish 
media at all, the general tone of the statements is optimistic colored with caution (Ministry 
of Treasury, 2015, Maciejasz, 2015, Ministry of Foreign, 2014, ), in stark contrast to the vit-
riol from Hungary’s and Germany’s political parties. Furthermore, Poland’s main concerns 
right now appear to be pushing Kaczynski’s populist agenda through parliament and as far 
as it will go, rather than blocking TTIP. Whereas Hungary’s leadership has been quite out-
spoken in both opposition to TTIP and furthering its own agenda, Poland’s main sticking 
points are the tribunal, Russia, and not kowtowing to German demands (Cienski, 2016, PiS 
partisans, On the naughty step, 2016, Rettman, 2015). 
The reasons for why Poland’s attitude about TTIP is so surprisingly different from 
Hungary and Germany are varied and strongly embedded in Europe’s past. Unlike Hunga-
ry, Poland was first invaded by Germany during World War II and then later partly annexed 
by the Soviet Union. As such, its recent political dynamic is rife with strong nationalism and 
calls for independence, especially from Germany. As both Germany and Brussels have called 
for Kaczynski and the Law and Justice Party to stop, anti-German sentiment has swept the 
nation. In the media, a magazine published a picture of Angela Merkel as Adolf Hitler, cap-
tioned “again they want to supervise Poland;” in the government, the German ambassador 
was summoned to the foreign minister’s office for “anti-Polish” comments from German 
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politicians and a German EU commissioner was scolded in official Polish-EU correspon-
dence for suggesting that Germans overseeing Poland carried the “worst possible connota-
tions” among Poles (On the naughty step, 2016, Cienski, 2016, PiS partisans).
Like Germany, Poland is a strong economic power in the EU, and like both Hungary 
and Germany, Poland looks forward to further strengthening ties with the USA through 
increased trade and a stronger military presence in Warsaw from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) (Sobczyk, 2016). Yet what motivates Poland to strengthen its ties 
with the USA differs slightly from Hungary’s motivations and Germany’s. Poland has long 
had a rocky history with Russia. This history stems both from the tragedies and atrocities 
committed during WWII and from being a satellite state of the Soviet Union for nearly half 
a century. It is further exacerbated by the fact that in 2010, 96 members of the Polish elite, 
including the entire army command and president, died in a plane crash in Russia (Gessen, 
2016, Davies, 2016, The German test, 2015). This event has left many Poles, including 
Kaczynski, whose twin brother Lech was the president at the time, suspicious of Russia and 
convinced that the plane crash was not an accident (Davies, 2016, Gessen, 2016). Indeed, 
for many Poles, the Law and Justice party is more than just a far-right party--it is the anti-
Putin party. As Russia begins to bristle at Poland by trying to compel Poland to acquiesce 
to its demands (Gessen, 2016), Poland is seeking help from America to be able to stand 
strong against Russia. These escalating tensions could also be driving Poland to strengthen 
its relations with the US in every way possible—but especially through free trade and TTIP 
(Sobczyk, 2016, Gessen, 2016).
Conclusions
Marine Le Pen, the French populist National Front’s leader and potential presidential 
candidate, has stated that “one of her goals [as president] would be to unite with the parties 
on the left to block [TTIP]” (Emmott, 2014). This statement is exemplary of the case made 
by economists and journalists that illiberalism is a critical factor in the opposition of TTIP in 
the EU. While it would obviously be beneficial to widen this study to more countries cases, 
the German, Polish, and Hungarian cases adequately show that, while illiberalism definitely 
colors opposition to TTIP, it is not necessarily a precondition for anti-free-trade movements 
in Europe. A number of prominent voices have made facile links between opposition to 
TTIP and the rise of the political far right, but these claims do not hold upon further ex-
amination. All of these countries experienced similar economic shocks and similar political 
histories as part of the controlled economy of the Soviet Union.  
Yet the rationale behind the opposition of TTIP is not as uniform as one would expect 
given these backgrounds. Even the main source of the opposition is different between the 
three countries. In Hungary, 53% of the population still supports TTIP, while the majority 
of anti-TTIP sentiment is spouted by the illiberal political leadership (Eurobarometer, 2015, 
p.34). In Germany, however, the ruling party is supportive of TTIP, whereas an over-
whelming majority of German constituents ardently opposes it. In Poland, the far-right gov-
ernment has stayed relatively silent compared to its neighbors on the subject of TTIP, and 
when it is mentioned at all, it is mentioned in cautiously optimistic tones—the opposite of 
leadership in Hungary. Its people are still some of the most supportive of TTIP in the entire 
EU, at 73% in 2014 and only slightly decreasing as of late 2015, thereby flouting the percep-
tion that a far-right movement must be at odds with either its government, as in Germany, 
or its people, as in Hungary (Eurobarometer, 2015, p.34). The Populist Party, Alternative 
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for Germany, has only recently adopted an anti-TTIP stance in an attempt to appeal to the 
German population’s fears of the deal. In Hungary, however, Orban has repeatedly rebuffed 
stronger ties with the US and the EU, including free trade, since he took office in 2010, 
whereas the majority of Hungarians still support increased trade with the US.  In observing 
these two countries’ opposition to TTIP, it becomes readily apparent that while that oppo-
sition exists in both countries, the source of that opposition—from the government or from 
the people—differs. Indeed, this variety of sources of opposition is mirrored in the USA, 
where the anti-trade rhetoric during the 2016 presidential race has been spouted by both 
Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, two individuals whose principles and policies could not 
be more different. Their coalition of anti-trade opinions has been deemed the “unholy al-
liance” (Paul, 2016). Moreover, Germany, Poland, and Hungary have other concerns that 
could better predict their reactions to TTIP, including sovereignty, agriculture and GMOs, 
transparency, and legality of the trade agreement. The global ramifications for TTIP include 
setting a precedent for other trade agreements in the future across the world.  Moving for-
ward, it is critical that we dispatch with the current analysis of the European situation with 
TTIP, looking forward to future trade deals with a careful consideration to avoid thinking 
of the EU as a totality instead of an enormously diverse place. 
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